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~from Miss. s. Ct. (~, 
he Court) 
State/Criminal Timely 
Cert to CA 5 (Coleman, Godbold, 
Hill) 
JOHN & JOHN Federal/Criminal Timely (by extension) 
1. SU~MARY: These two straight-lined cases present the 
same quetion: did the criminal offense committed by two Choctaw 





community", as those terms are defined i'n 18 u.s.c. § 1151? The 
answer to that question dictates whether the Indians were 
' ---
properly subject to federal or state jurisdiction for their 
......._ .........._ 0'!7"'< ............ -~-.......-~-
offense. In separate decisions, the Miss. S. Ct. and CA 5 -- --reached the same conclusion -- that the state had jurisdiction 
and the SG and the Indians seek review here. 
2. FACTS: Smith John and Harry Smith John, father and 
son, are Choctaw Indians who live in what used to be Choctaw 
territory in Mississippi. They are appellants in No. 77-575 and 
resps in No. 77-836. They were charged with the offense of 
assault with intent to kill in both federal and state court. 
They were convicted in both (but only of the lesser included 
offense of assault in federal court), and were sentenced to 90 
days in jail and a $300 find in federal court, and to two years 
in jail in state court. They have served their federal sentence, 
but not their state sentence. (The CA held that the fact 
that they had served the federal sentence did not moot the case, 
under Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40.) 
Whether the federal or state authorities had 
jurisdiction over this offense depends on the application of 18 
u.s.c. §§ 1151, 1153. The latter section is the Major Crimes 
Act, which makes criminal certain conduct "within the Indian 
country", including assault with intent to kill. 
defin4es "Indian country" as follows: 
Section 1151 
• • • (a) all land within the limits of any 
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, in6luding 
rights-of-way running through the reservation, 
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the 
borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the 
limits of a state •.•• " 
3. 
In opposing the assertion of state jurisdiction, the Johns 
claimed that they carne under § 1151; the United States made the 
same argument in support of federal jurisdiction in federal 
0~ 
court. The Miss. s. Ct. rejected the argument, primarily~the 
ground that the Choctaw Indian reservation in Mississippi had 
been extinguished by the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek in 1830, 
and subsequent federal statutes did not change this situation. 
CA 5 reached the same conclusion, despite the fact that the Johns 
and the United States both argued in support of federal 
jurisdiction. 
The relevant treaty, statutes, and other federal action 
relevant to this problem are as follows: 
(1) 1830--Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek. Choctaws 
cede land in Mississippi to the federal government; many of them 
move to Oklahoma; others remain in Miss., as state citizens and 
on individual parcels of land. 
(2) 1918--federal government begins to give financial 
and other relief to individual Choctaws in Mississippi, and to 
buy land for them. 
(3) 1934--Congress enacts Indian Reorganization Act 
(IRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479, which authorized the Secretary of 




existing reservations • • • for the purpose of providing lands 
for Indians", id. § 465, and to "proclaim new Indian reservations 
on lands acquired pursuant to . this Act." Id § 467. The 
United States began to buy land for the Mississippi Choctaws 
under these provisions. 
(4) 1939--Act of June 21, 1939 gave ownership of the 
lands mentioned in (2) to the u. s. in trust for the Mississippi 
Choctaws. The purpose of this action was to place the lands 
already purchased in the same status as land purchased pursuant 
to the IRA, so that the Choctaws could organize a tribal 
government under 25 u.s.c. § 476. 
(5) 1944--Pursuant to the 1939 Act and 25 u.s.c. § 467, 
the Secretary declared that the lands purchased for the 
Mississippi Choctaws "are hereby declared to be an Indian 
reservation for the benefit of those members of the Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians of one-half or more Indian blood." In 
1945 the Secretary ratified the Constitution and Bylaws of the 
Mississippi Choctaws. 
The rationale of each of the courts below, in denying 
that the Mississippi Choctaw lands constitute "Indian country", 
is based on interpretation of all the above actions. 
Essentially, the courts held that all the subsequent 
congressional activity could not negate the fact that the 
Mississippi Choctaws ceased being a tribe, and their land ceased 
being a reservation, when the 1830 Treaty was signed. Subsequent 
congressional action could not override that treaty, and in any 
5. 
event the IRA does not apply to these Indians because they were 
not a tribe when the IRA was passed (in 1934); Congress did not 
intend to include "emancipated" Indians (i.e., those who no 
longer were wards of the federal government but rather were state 
citizens) under the IRA; and the subsequent actions in 1939 and 
1944 could not change this. Finally, in buying up land and 
giving other relief to the Mississippi Choctaws, Congress did not 
intend to reconstitute them a tribe and their land a 
reservation. CA 5 expressly disclaimed reaching the question 
whether Congress could reconstitute a tribe, because it concluded 
that Congress did not intend to do so. It noted that a section 
of the IRA recognized that the Choctaw Indian Tribe is located in 
Oklahoma. The CA concluded that the 1830 Treaty was not 
"amended, modified or abrogated by the .•. Acts of Congress" 
referred to above between 1918 and 1939. 
Each of the courts below relied on an earlier precedent, 
but all the parties seem to agree that the decision of this 
question was not necessary to either the earlier state or federal 
decision. (The SG explains that it did not seek cert. from the 
earlier CA 5 decision, United States v. State Tax Comm•n, 505 
F.2d 633, because the point was not necessary to the decision.) 
3. CONTENTIONS: (1) The Johns and the SG contend that 
the courts below were clearly in error in their conclusion and in 
several of its supporting premises. For example, Congress can 
amend a treaty by a later statute, see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 
187 U.S. 553~ Congress can reestablish a defunct tribe (and 
( ' 
6. 
indeed this was one of the purposes of the IRA), because of 
Congress' plenary power to regulate Indian affairs and its power 
to provide federal jurisdiction and guardianship for the 
"remnants of an established tribe", see United States v. McGowan, 
302 U.S. 535; Congress manifested its intent to do just that 
here, through its purchases of land to be held in trust for the 
Indians and its other appropriations; and the CA's limiting 
construction of the IRA (to apply only to Indians in the 
guardian-ward relationship, and not to Indians who had been 
"emancipated'' and become state citizens) is not derived from the 
language or legislative history of the Act, runs counter to the 
canon that statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of 
Indians, and conflicts with Maynor v. Morton, 510 F.2d 1254 (CADC 
1975). Finally, state citizenship is not incompatible with 
tribal existence and federal guardianship. ~, McClanahan v. 
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164. The SG also cites several 
decisions in other CAs in conflict with several of the premises 
of the courts below in this case. 
(2) The SG contends that the United States' alternative 
contention was not even addressed by the CA, namely, that even if 
not a "reservation" under § 115l(a)
1 
the territory now inhabited 
by the Choctaws is a "dependent Indian community" within the 
meaning of § 115l(b). See United States v. McGowan, supra) at 
538-39. 
(3) The tribe itself, as amicus, adds the contention 





is a political question, as to which the courts below should have 
accepted the determination of the Executive, in the form of the 
Secretary's proclamation of 1944. 
Because the Johns agree with the SG that they are 
subject to federal, not state, jurisdiction, they acquiesce in __:;. ________ . ~--- ---.___.- ·~ 
the SG's cert . petn. Mississippi, as appellee in No. 77-575, 
argues that this is not a proper appeal under either§ 1257(1) or 
(2), and repeats the arguments of the courts below on the merits. -
4. DISCUSSION: As to jurisdiction in N • 77-575, ) I 
think appellee is right. The Johns contend that the Miss. S. Ct. 
upheld the state criminal statute against a federal 
constitutional challenge, but they do not specify what the 
constitutional challenge was, and the only conceivable one would 
be the supremacy clause. They also contend that the state court 
invalidated as unconstitutional the IRA and the 1939 Act, but 
this is not what happened. The IRA was found inapplicabl e, and 
the 1939 Act simply was construed. If the Court decides to t a ke 
this case, therefore, it should postpone jurisdiction. 
On the merits, the Court probably should grant the SG's 
petn and consolidate it with the purported appeal. The decisions 
___,. 
below are questionable; and although they could be viewed as of 
narrow factual importance, they might affect many other tribes, 
and they appear to conflict with decisions of this court and 
several CAs in interpreting the IRA and other Indian enactments. 
Although the same issue is presented in both cases, so 
that one conceivably could be held for the other, both should be 
( 
taken and consolidated in order to get the views of the federal 
government and the State. 
There is a response in 77-836, and a motion to dismiss 
and an amicus brief in support of the J.S. in 77-836. 
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JAN 13 1978 
No. 77-836 
NOT VOTING 
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO 
To: Mr. Justice Powell April 17, 1978 
From: Jim Alt 
No. 77-575, Smith John v. Mississippi;~ 
No. 77-836, United States v. Smith John. 
These cases, arising out of successive federal and state 
prosecutions for the same act, present the question whether the 
·-
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to try crimes 
committed by Choctaw Indians on certain land in Mississippi owned 
by the United States and denominated an "Indian reservation" 
by the Secretary of Interior in 1944. In No. 77-575, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court held that the federal government does not have such 
jurisdiction, and in No. 77-836, the Fifth Circuit, per Judge 
Coleman (a former governor of Mississippi) reached the same 
conclusion. I think that both courts are wrong. 
The statutory framework in which the cases arise is set by 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 1151. § 1153, the "Major Crimes Act," 
provides (emphasis supplied): 
2. 
"Any Indian who connnits against the person or property 
of another Indian or other person . • . ass·ault with intent 
to kill • • • within the Indian country, shall be subject 
to the same laws and penalties as all other persons 
connnitting any of the above offenses, within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States." 
§ 1151 defines the term "Indian country" as follows: 
"[T]he term 'Indian country', as used in this chapter, 
means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, .•• (b) all dependent Indian connnunities 
within the borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and 
whether within or without the limits of a state, and 
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have 
not been extinguished ..• " 
The question thus is whether the offense here was connnitted 
"within the Indian country" within the meaning of these laws. 
In Part I below, I briefly trace the history needed to 
understand the case. In Part II, I evaluate the arguments of 
the courts below and the parties here. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CHOCTAW INDIANS. 
The Choctaw Indians lived in Mississippi and surrounding 
States before the arrival of the white man. By 1817, when 
Mississippi became a State, the pressure was building to move 
the Choctaw west. In 1830, this aim was accomplished in the main 
by the signing of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, 7 Stat. 333. 
Under the Treaty, the Choctaw tribe ceded the last 10,500,000 
acres of its land in Mississippi to the United States and agreed 
to move to land in Oklahoma. Article XIV of the Treaty, however, 
allowed those Choctaws who elected to remain in Mississippi to -do so: 
"Each Choctaw head of a family being d.esirou:$ to remain 
and become a citizen of the State, sh~ll be permitted to 
do so ••• andhe or she shall thereupon be entitled to 
a reservation of one section of six hundred and forty acres 
of land • • • • Persons who claim under this article shall 
not lose the privilege of a Choctaw citizen, b~t if they 
ever remove are not entitled to any portion of the Choctaw 
annuity [provided by other articles of the Treaty]." 
3. 
In the years immediately following Senate ratification of the Treaty, 
about two-thirds of the Mississippi Choctaw removed to Oklahoma. 
~ -~ose who remained in Mississippi generally fell on hard times. 
~ Most did not receive the land promised to them by the Treaty, see 
~ ~ Choctaw Nation v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 1, 15-16 (1935), and 
this Court has said that by 1893 "the full-blood Mississippi 
Choctaws were extremely poor, living in unsanitary conditions and 
working at manual labor for daily wages. Their children were not 
permitted to attend schools provided for the whites, and they were 
denied all social and political privileges. [T]hey were receiving 
neither care nor attention from the Indian Office or the Department 
of the Interior; II Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 379 (1921). . . . 
Finally, in 1918, Congress began to take measures to relieve 
the plight of the Mississippi Choctaw. By the Act of May 25, 1918, 
40 Stat. 561, 573, Congress appropriated funds 
"[f]or the relief of distress among the full-blood Choctaw 
Indians of Mississippi, including • • . for the purchase of 
lands, including improvements thereon, not exceeding eighty 
acres for any one family, for the use and occupancy of said 
Indians . • • " 
4. 
Subsequent appropriations provided for the purchase of more 
lands, and most purchases were made in and around seven traditional 
Choctaw villages in central Mississippi. Although these 
appropriations acts contemplated that the Choctaw would repay 
the money thus spent, this proved to be impossible. 
By the Act of June 21, 1939, 53 Stat. 851, Congress directed 
that all the lands purchased for the Mississippi Choctaw since 
1918 be held by "the United States in trust for such Choctaw 
Indians of one-half or more Indian blood, resident in Mississippi, 
as shall be designated by the Secretary of the Interior." The 
House Report accompanying this bill states that this provision "will 
facilitate matters greatly if the Indians should choose to 
organize under Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act [of 
1934, which allows tribes residing on reservations to adopt tribal 
constitutions], and take over administration of their lands." 
H.R. Rep. No. 194, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939). 
In 1944, purportedly acting under § 7 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, the Secretary of the Interior issued a Proclamation 
stating that all the lands put in trust by the 1939 Act "are 
hereby declared to be an Indian reservation for the benefit of 
those members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, of 
one-half or more Indian blood, resident in Mississippi and enrolled 
at the Choctaw Indian Agency . " 9 Fed. Reg. 14907 (1944). 
In 1945, again purportedly acting pursuant to the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, the Mississippi Choctaw adopted and 
the Secretary of the Interior approved a tribal constitution and 
5. 
by-laws. 
In the period from 1918 to the present, the Interior 
Department established tribal schools and built a tribal hospital, 
jail, and housing for the Mississippi Choctaw. Brief for Amicus 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 8-9. Until 1968, however, 
law enforcement on tribal land was left to county officials. At 
~~ that time a tribal court was established, and the United States 
~ exercised exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by or 
~~nst Choctaws on Choctaw land until the instant case arose. 
We are told that about 3,000 Choctaws live on or near the 
reservation involved in these cases. Roughly 80% of them speak -
the Choctaw language as their first language. Id., at 7-8. 
The majority of these Choctaw are full-blooded Ind~ns. Ibid. 
II. ARGUMENTS. 
l,A; t,. 
~ ~ · A. The defendant in these cases and the United States argue 
~~that the lands held by the United States in trust for the Choctaw 
~ ..t-<-.~re "Indian country" within both subsection (a) of § 1151, "all 
~~~ land within the limits of any Indian reservation," and subsection 
·'~ _,.. ,, 
(b), "all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the 
United States." They therefore conclude that the federal government 
has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed on these lands 
:=-~~~~~~~~ -----, 
under § 1153. 
CA 5 and the Mississippi Supreme Court took the position that 
the Secretary of the Interior exceeded his authority under the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 by declaring the Choctaw lands 
to be a "reservation" because "the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 was not intended to apply, and does not apply, to the Mississippi 
6. 
Choctaws." Pet. for Cert. in No. 77-836, at 19A. CA 5 in particular 
emphasized the fact that from 1830 until at least 1918, the 
Choctaw who remained in Mississippi were citizens of the State, 
subject to State criminal jurisdiction, and not part of any 
organized tribe. The existence of the Mississippi tribe of 
Choctaw was terminated, the court thought, by the 1830 Treaty • 
..-1Ebe court also asserted that Congress in 1934 was legislating 
with reference to tri~es of Indians, not individual Indians; and 
that it "was legislating for Indians in the government-guardian-
ward relationship, and not for long emancipated individuals outside 
that relationship." Id., at 20A. 
I believe that this is an unduly narrow view of the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934. Section 19 of the Act, 25 u.s.c. 
§ 479, defines the "Indians" to whom the Act applies as including, 
among others, "all ••• persons of one-half or more Indian blood." 
The Mississippi Chpctaw plainly are -within this definition. 
-
Section 5 of the Act, 25 u.s.c. § 465, pursuant to which the 
Secretary purchased land for the Mississippi Choctaw after 1934, 
authorizes the Secretary to acquire land "in the name of the United 
States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for 
which the land is acquired .•• " Thus, even if the Choctaw 
were not a recognized tribe between 1934 and 1944, the Secretary's 
land acquisitions were authorized by law. Finally, and most 
importantly, Section 7 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 467, authorizes 
the Secretary "to proclaim new Indian reservations on lands acquired 
pursuant to any authority conferred by this Act ••• " Thus, 
7. 
I would conclude that the Secretary acted within his authority 
under the Act in 1944 when he declared the land held by the United 
States in trust for the Mississippi Choctaw a "reservation." 
In addition, contemporanous administrative interpretation and 
subsequent legislative actions seem to bear out the notion that 
the Mississippi Choctaw are within the class of persons for whose 
benefit the 1934 Act was passed. Section 18 of the Act, 25 u.s.c. 
§ 478, provided that the Act would not apply to "any reservation 
wherein a majority of the adult Indians" voted against it. Pursuant 
to this section, in 1935 the Secretary held an election among 
the Mississippi Choctaw in which those persons voted to accept the 
Act. In addition, in 1939, when Congress directed that the Choctaw 
land in Mississippi be held in trust by the United States, it 
clearly contemplated that the Choctaw would adopt a tribal 
constitution under § 16 of the 1934 Act. See House Report, quoted 
at page 4, supra. 
Moreover, whether or not the Mississippi Choctaw were a "tribe" 
they 
in 1939 or 1944,/were recognized) as · such in 1945 when the Secretary 
approved their constitution under § 16 of the 1934 Act. This 
Court traditionally has deferred to the executive and legislative 
branches' determinations of whether a group of Indians is a "tribe." 
See cases cited in Brief for Smith John at 44. Such deference 
especially 
would be appropriate in this case,/given Congress' apparent 
agreement with the Secretary's designation. 
B. CAS also suggested that Congress could not have intended 
the definition of "Indian country" in § 1151, which was enacted in 
8. 
1948, to apply to the dispersed tracts of land that make up the 
Mississippi Choctaw reservation. See Pet. for Cert. in No. 77-836, 
at 5A-8A. But CAS did not mention the fact that § 1151 was intended 
merely to codif-y this Court's prior decisions defining "Indian 
country" for purposes of the Major Crimes Act. See Revisor's Note 
to 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Those prior cases made it clear that "Indian 
country" can include land purchased by the United States upon 
which a group of Indians live, whether or not the land has been 
denominated a "reservation," United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 
535 (1938); and that even an individual Indian's allotment may 
be "Indian country," United States v. Pelican, 232 u.s. 442 (1914). 
Under those decisions, I believe that the Mississippi Choctaw 
land would have been considered "Indian country" even without the 
enactment of § 1151. 
~ 
C. I must note two arguments that the State does not make, 
because they may be raised by other Justices. First, it could 
be argued ~asxxkaXMississippixxSHpxHMHxRaxxxxdidxaxgae 
criminal 
that Congress did not have the power to pre-empt State/jurisdiction 
over the lands here involved without the State's consent. The 
United States, anticipating such an argument, demonstrates that 
Congress' power over Indians and its power under the Property 
Clause is such that the State's consent is not necessary. See 
Brief for u.s., at 31-39. Thus, even though . the State admittedly 
had jurisdiction over the Mississippi Choctaw from 1830 to 1939, 
a reservation of land under the 1934 Act would pre-empt that 
jurisdiction. 
It also might be argued that the federal jurisdiction under 
the Major Crimes Act should be found to be concurrent with State 
jurisdiction, rather than exclusive. The language of the Major 
Crimes Act itself seems to B me to preclude such a holding. In 
addition, no other case has found Major Crimes Act jurisdiction 
to be concuerent rather than exclusive. Although the strange 
circumstances of this case might militate toward such a finding, 
I think it would create more problems than it would solve. In 
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.:§npuutt <!f4lltrl oi t!rt ~tb .:§tattg 
~asfrhtgfltlt. ~. <!f. 2l!,?J!.;l / 
June 16, 1978 
Re: Nos. 77-757 John v. Mississippi; and United States 
v. John 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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